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This paper analyzes how knowledge is reproduced as “universal” in contemporary higher education 
and how this production of universality influences the application of knowledge. Using a case study 
of clinical psychology, it describes the results of over two years of ethnographic fieldwork in a 
university and professional settings in Singapore with short comparative field studies in Australia 
and the Netherlands. The results provide critical insights into the cultural effects and knowledge 
contestations within transnational higher education. [anthropology of knowledge, anthropology 
of psychology, ethnography of education, universal knowledge, transnational education]
There are a lot of practitioners [of psychology] who come in and say
“so that's the world standard. You've got to go from where you are to here.”
 – Lisa, academic in Singapore, interview 17 April 2014
This paper explores how knowledge is reproduced as “universal” and how this affects 
knowledge application, through a case study of an academic discipline. The presentation 
of knowledge as universal is not new in university curricula and practices; indeed, the 
academic prototype of knowledge is that it is context free, coherent, progressive, and natu-
ral; what Fredrik Barth (2002, 2) calls “a knowledge without knowers.” In recent decades, 
higher education has internationalized on a massive scale and universities have become 
embroiled in a race for world class education. With this change academics and students 
are expected to have a global outlook and capabilities (Matthews and Sidhu 2005), which 
has increased the transnational export of certain knowledges that are deemed universally 
applicable. Problematically, many of these ‘universal’ knowledges have been critiqued for 
being rooted in hegemonic Anglo-American academic traditions (Ng 2012; Yang 2006) and 
historical mappings confirm that some knowledge expands through postcolonial path-
ways from north to south and from west to east (Geerlings et al. 2014). Thus, university cur-
ricula, and the knowledges they present, should be understood as culturally constructed 
products, and their spread carries the risk of creating epistemological hegemonies.
This paper presents an ethnographic case study of clinical psychology, a domain of 
knowledge that is often presented as universally applicable. Clinical psychology focuses 
on the prevention, diagnosis, and treatment of mental illness (American Psychological 
Association 2017). It is taught as postgraduate programs in universities, and graduates 
conduct psychological assessments, diagnoses, and psychotherapy in mental health in-
stitutions, hospitals, and clinics. As an example of contemporary and problematic “uni-
versal” knowledge, clinical psychology models and theories are critiqued within the 
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discipline for being predominantly based on research conducted by Caucasian-American 
researchers, with similar research participants (Arnett 2008; Henrich et al. 2010). This 
has caused some within the discipline to call their therapies, practices, and diagnostic 
methods western biased (Fernando 2003; Gerstein et al. 2009; Lange and Davison 2015; 
Thakker and Ward 1998). Furthermore, education in clinical psychology across the world 
is increasingly standardized according to American designed training models (Geerlings 
et al. 2014). Clinical psychology thus potentially illustrates a hegemonic reproduction of 
“universal” knowledge.
Discussions of hegemony often invoke cultural imperialism as an important theoretical 
framework; however, the effects of “universal” knowledge resist easy categorization into 
colonizing and colonized ideas. Postcolonial scholarship has demonstrated that western 
education was never simply received by colonial subjects; instead, hegemonic knowledge 
and ideas are actively negotiated and can have unintended effects (Vora 2015). Similarly, 
categories of thought in contemporary curricula may be marked by European imperial-
ism (Willinsky 1998) but are also subject to locally informed interpretations, appropria-
tions, and contestations (Chatterjee and Maira 2014). In addition, the conceptualization 
of knowledge as “Anglo-American” or “western” reveals a problematic cultural essen-
tialism. In previous work, we applied Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy of rhizomat-
ics (1977, 1988) to an academic discipline to explain how knowledges are continuously 
changing as they are taught, explained, interpreted, and re-interpreted (Geerlings and 
Lundberg 2014). This re-actualization of knowledge takes place at multiple, intersecting 
levels, including country, university, classroom, group, and individual. Consequently, 
knowledge is never stable or delineated, and cannot be essentialized into one identity 
such as “western”; rather, knowledge is subject to interpretation by local actors. Therefore, 
we propose in this paper that it is more intellectually fruitful to analyze how knowledges 
are presented and reproduced as universal in contemporary higher education and how this 
production of “universality” influences the application of knowledge. This perspective 
re-embeds knowledge in the processes of social relations.
The social relations underlying knowledge (re)production have been studied before. 
For example, the sociologist Michèle Lamont (2009) analyzed the social production of 
standards for academic excellence in the interactions between “experts” engaged in peer 
review processes. Taking another perspective, educational scholars Mitchell Stevens and 
Cynthia Miller-Idriss and anthropologist Seteney Shami (2018) showed that American ac-
ademics pursue particular lines of inquiry partly due to career pressures within their insti-
tutions. These and other works re-embed knowledge in social processes and demonstrate 
the impact of power (in these examples: academic status and institutional pressures) on 
these processes. This highlights the continued relevance of Michel Foucault’s theoriza-
tions of the interrelations between knowledge and power. Through his case studies across 
madness (mental health), criminality, and sexuality, Foucault revealed that knowledge is 
interwoven with power relations. Moreover, in specific times and places, particular knowl-
edges are promoted as “truth” while other knowledges are disregarded as mere beliefs. 
The knowledges that count as “truths” are articulated through discourses, which include 
knowledge aspects, subjectivities, and power relations (Foucault 1980). Discourses serve 
as filters through which we perceive the world and our place in the world. They justify 
particular actions and render alternative actions invalid; promote certain ideas from par-
ticular people while silencing other enquiries and people (Geerlings and Lundberg 2018). 
Thus, an analysis of the social processes of knowledge reproduction in clinical psychology 
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is also an analysis of power relations in contemporary higher education. There is a need 
to delve deeper into these issues, for which we turn to the anthropology of knowledge.
Anthropology of Knowledge, Phenomenology, Power/Knowledge
Fredrik Barth is recognized as a leading scholar in the subfield of the anthropology of 
knowledge. Through his studies of ritual and cosmology in tropical Papua New Guinea 
and Bali, Barth had come to regard knowledge as central to describing his ethnographic 
encounters. He defines knowledge as “what a person employs to interpret and act on the 
world” (Barth 2002, 1). Barth recognizes thoughts and feelings, and tacit, embodied, clas-
sificatory, and verbal aspects of knowledge (1995, 66). He notes that a major advantage 
of this anthropology of knowledge is that it moves anthropologists’ attention away from 
culture as an object of study, which he believed caused misguided analyses of culture as a 
thing that exists a priori to people and of people as cultural artefacts. Instead, Barth main-
tained, an anthropology of knowledge “points to people’s engagement with the world, 
through action” (1995, 66).
Barth’s articulation of an anthropology of knowledge as “people’s engagement with 
the world through action” resonates with Martin Heidegger’s phenomenology (1971). 
In his later work, Heidegger explored the everyday practices of being in the world (on-
tology), theorizing that it is through using the things of the world, that we come to ex-
perience the world. The processes of coming to know (epistemology) take place though 
everyday practices. In other words, knowledge is not an abstracted and distanced men-
tal calculation; rather, understanding rests in the shared everyday activities of being in 
the world. Furthermore, Barth (1995, 66) proposed to study people’s engagements with 
the world in situated milieus. Like Heidegger, Barth was aware of the subtle reciprocal 
workings of human actions and situated milieus, and the importance of these contexts 
in acting in/on the world. He argued that “in focusing on action, we focus on the locus 
where people deploy cultural materials to interpret the situation in which they act and 
design their action to have an effect on the world” (Barth in Borofsky et al. 2001, 436). 
Thus, by refocusing our ethnographies on people’s subjectively purposeful and meaning-
ful acts, we combine ontological and epistemological considerations. Barth advocated a 
comparative perspective of knowledge. He did this in order to unravel aspects of cultural 
worlds, which humans are always in the processes of constructing and deconstructing. 
To this end he maintained that any tradition of knowledge has three interrelated facets: a 
body of substantive assertions and ideas, communication of these ideas, and their trans-
mission through instituted social relations (2002, 3). A comparative ethnography of these 
three intersecting aspects of knowledge can reveal how criteria for universal validity and 
knowledge coherence are generated, as well as potentialities for change (2002, 3). Barth 
(2002) furthermore maintains that these facets of knowledge appear together in people’s 
everyday engagements with the world through action. Importantly, the study of these 
interfaces. In the specific case social situations and contexts, reveals openings through 
which people actively create knowledge and cultures of knowledge. This actor-oriented 
and processual perspective was common across all his ethnographic work.
Barth was known for the unusually wide range of ethnographic sites in which he 
undertook fieldwork over a long anthropological career. However, even though geo-
graphically and culturally dispersed, his ethnographic interests and fieldwork sites were 
consistently in the realms of borders. In other words, in the spaces where knowledge 
and cultural practices meet, touch, transition—and may be appropriated, transformed or 
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contested. The following case study is likewise an example of ethnographic fieldwork in 
an interstitial space—that of transnational education.
A Field of “Universal” Knowledge: Settings and Methodologies
The field of clinical psychology with its standardized practices is a particularly strong 
example of “universal” knowledge. It is a knowledge practice applied across the globe 
but that mainly depends on ideas developed in western Europe and the USA. The disci-
plinary spread of “universal” knowledge is through transnational education, and in order 
to study the effects of this knowledge, ethnographic fieldwork for this study was under-
taken for over two years in the global education hub of Singapore, with additional field 
visits to Australia and the Netherlands. The field visits to Australia and the Netherlands 
allowed for comparison of the social processes that present knowledge as “universal” in 
different geographical and cultural settings, which are contextualized by the single his-
torical set of global relations in the production and exchange of knowledge, which is built 
especially on colonialism.
Case Study Contexts
In Singapore fieldwork was conducted in universities and mental health clinics. A for-
mer British crown colony, upon independence in 1965 Singapore adopted “multiracial” so-
cial policies that regulate its diversity by recognizing multiple ethnicities (Chinese, Malay, 
Indian, and Others), religions, and languages (English, Mandarin, Malay, and Tamil). The 
education system was modelled after the former colonizers, and since 2003, Singapore’s 
higher education sector is increasingly internationalized. Clinical psychology was intro-
duced to Singapore from Australia in 1965 as part of the development scheme called the 
Colombo Plan (Geerlings et al. 2014). In 1998, the first graduate program in clinical psy-
chology commenced at the National University of Singapore. It was heavily dependent 
on imported ideas and lecturers who were trained abroad (Singh and Kaur 2002). As we 
have argued previously (Geerlings et al. 2014), this foreign dependency has taken new 
shape with the rise of international education. Currently, of the four graduate programs in 
clinical psychology in Singapore, three are provided (partly) by an Australian university 
and are accredited by the Australian Psychological Accreditation Council (Geerlings et 
al. 2014). Given this connection, additional field visits were conducted at universities and 
mental health clinics in Australia.
Clinical psychology had been transferred by British colonial scholars to Australia early 
in the nineteenth century and is currently more locally appropriated in that country. Thirty 
universities provide clinical psychology graduate education, practicing clinical psychol-
ogists are required to have a graduate degree accredited by the Australian Psychological 
Accreditation Council, and they need to register with the Australian Psychology Board 
(Geerlings et al. 2014). The regional neighbors, Singapore and Australia, are close collabo-
rators in clinical psychology education, and both use English as a medium for instruction 
and practice. Thus, for a further comparison of the social practices that construct knowl-
edge as “universal” in a different geographical, cultural, and linguistic setting, field visits 
were conducted in the different context of the Netherlands.
In the Netherlands, clinical psychology education is offered in eight public universi-
ties, and Dutch is often the language of instruction, although English is becoming more 
common. Initially, clinical psychology in the Netherlands was linked to the German psy-
choanalytic approach; however, American standardizations are increasingly shaping the 
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country’s psychology training and practice (Dehue 1991). Graduates are registered as pro-
visional psychologists with those wishing to practice clinical psychology independently 
requiring an additional two years of post-master training in a Dutch university (Geerlings, 
Thompson, Kraaij et al. 2018).
Author Positionalities
The selection of these fieldwork sites was influenced by the authors’ positionalities vis-
à-vis the research topic. During research, both authors were affiliated with an Australian 
university in Singapore, the first author as a graduate research student who was super-
vised by the second author. We combined our cultural understandings of Singapore and 
the other fieldwork contexts to aid our comparative analyses. One author is Dutch, stud-
ied anthropology and psychology in the Netherlands, and had been in Singapore for two 
years at the start of the fieldwork. The other author is Australian, has conducted anthro-
pological fieldwork in the Malay Archipelago, and worked eleven years in Australian 
higher education and seven years in Singapore. Both authors are multilingual with their 
respective native languages Dutch and English. The first author conducted the ethno-
graphic fieldwork and preliminary analysis. This paper was written collaboratively.
Ethnographic Sites and Methods
The first author worked for two years as an administrative assistant in a psychology 
training clinic attached to the campus of an Australian university in Singapore. In addition 
to her official work duties, which were divided over one to three days a week and ranged 
from receiving clients to assisting trainees, the first author often visited the clinic on her 
off days. She became a confidante to some of the graduate students and academics. The 
second fieldwork site was the research common room at the same university, which was 
occupied by clinical psychology graduate students in their final stage of training: disserta-
tion writing. The research common room was out of earshot of academics, which enabled 
confidential conversations with students. A final category of fieldwork contexts were psy-
chologists’ work sites, including hospitals and clinics, and related public places such as 
lunchrooms. Work visits were often combined with a semistructured interview focused 
on experiences of practicing clinical psychology (see Geerlings, Thompson, Bouma et al. 
2018 for the interview outline). In total, fifteen interviews were conducted in Singapore: 
five graduate students, five alumni, and five academics of clinical psychology programs. 
The interviews were recorded and transcribed for analysis (see Table 1).
In Australia, fieldwork was conducted in the psychology training clinics of two public 
universities in Queensland, a state that is home to different communities of Aboriginal 
and Torres Strait Islander people (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2012) and multiple mi-
grant groups (Australian Government 2012). The first author spent one week at each 
university, in a vacant consultation room of the clinical psychology department of one 
university and in the common room for psychology graduates of the other. These sites 
enabled casual conversations with graduate students and teaching staff. In addition, sem-
istructured interviews were conducted with eight graduate students and four academics.
In the Netherlands, fieldwork sites were the clinical psychology institutes of two pub-
lic universities and two private clinics located in two cities. Two weeks were spent in one 
university in the multicultural urban area of the west, and one week in another university 
bordering Germany. In addition to fieldwork observations, fourteen interviews were con-
ducted: five graduate students, five alumni of graduate programs who were working as 
clinical psychologists in the Netherlands, and four academics.
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Informants
In the context of the small pool of clinical psychologists in Singapore, extra care needs 
to be taken to maintain confidentiality. Therefore, demographic characteristics of the key 
informants are withheld. Overall, most student informants were Singaporean citizens, 
while the majority of the academics were not from Singapore and received their graduate 
training in western countries. The four main cultural groups in Singapore are represented: 
most informants were Chinese Singaporeans, some Indian Singaporeans, some Malay 
Singaporeans and foreign others. Most informants were female. The majority of infor-
mants in Australia were white Australian; only a few informants did not have Australian 
nationality. None of the informants identified as being of Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander descent; we acknowledge that this research would have benefitted from their ex-
periences and perspectives, along with those of other cultural minority groups (Dudgeon 
Table 1.  
Summary of Field Work Sites, Methods, and Data sources
Sites Methods Duration Data sources
Singapore    
Psychology training 
clinic
Participant-observation 1–3 days a week for 
2 years
Ethnographic field 
notes
Research common 
room
Participant-observation 3–5 days a week for 
2 years
Ethnographic field 
notes
Work sites & related 
public spaces
Observation & conversation 17 visits of 
1–2 hours
Ethnographic field 
notes
 Semistructured interviews 15 interviews Interview 
transcripts & 
notes
Australia    
Psychology training 
clinic
Observation & conversation 5 days Ethnographic 
field notes
 Semistructured interviews 7 interviews Interviews 
transcripts & 
notes
Psychology common 
room
Observation & conversation 5 days Ethnographic field 
notes
 Semistructured interviews 5 interviews Interview 
transcripts & 
notes
Netherlands    
Psychology common 
rooms in two 
universities
Observation & conversation 14 days Ethnographic field 
notes
 Semistructured interviews 12 interviews Interview 
transcripts & 
notes
Work sites Observation & conversation 2 visits of 1 hour 
each
Ethnographic field 
notes
 Semistructured interviews 2 interviews Interview 
transcripts & 
notes
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et al. 2010). In the Netherlands, informants were local and international students, while the 
clinical psychologists were predominantly cultural majority Dutch. Similar to Singapore, 
the majority of the informants in Australia and the Netherlands were female.
Data Analysis
Ethnographic data consisted of fieldwork notes, interview notes, and transcripts. The 
first author, who also conducted the fieldwork, coded the data and organized these codes 
into themes that provide insights into the lived experiences of studying, teaching, and 
applying clinical psychology knowledge in the fieldwork settings. The progress in coding 
and analyzing the data was discussed on a monthly basis with the second author to estab-
lish interrater reliability. The analysis was informed by phenomenological anthropology, 
which is reflective and thus extends from the informants’ experiences to the first author’s 
personal reflections during fieldwork (Jackson 1996). Additionally, the ethnographic data 
invoke theory rather than being derived from theory. Phenomenological anthropology 
thus moves away from distanced analytical approaches that are guided by theory, such 
as those often used in psychology (Geerlings, Thompson, Bouma et al. 2018; Geerlings, 
Thompson, Kraaij et al. 2018; Geerlings et al. 2017). In our experience, phenomenological 
anthropology better equips us to understand the processual nature of knowledge con-
testation within the social contexts in which they occur. It led us to three main anthropo-
logical reflections on the production of “universal” knowledge. Each of these reflections, 
presented below, is illustrated with quotes from informants or fieldwork diary notes. 
Quotes are presented verbatim, are italicized, and brackets are used to identify material 
that was changed for clarification or confidentiality.
Ethnographic Fieldwork Reflections I, II, III
I. White or Colorless? Discourses of Science
I'm trying to set up support groups. But we're getting resistance left, right, center, and all that. So, feed-
back I've been getting is that some patients even said: “I'm not Caucasian, I don't want to talk about my 
feelings!” So, these are all successful programs that we read about in the literature, that we hear about 
from overseas. It doesn't make sense why it wouldn't work in the Singaporean context. Yi Ling, clinical 
psychologist, Singapore, interview 30 June 2014
Yi Ling chuckles and throws her arms in the air to express her disbelief. We are at her con-
sultation room in a public hospital in Singapore; she is wearing a formal blue shirt and is 
seated at her desk topped with a computer, papers, and a model of a brain. She is eating 
during our conversation (“Hope you don’t mind I’m having a late lunch? It’s been kinda busy 
today!”). I am sitting at the other side of the desk, the patients’ side, looking at her and feel-
ing my stomach rumble from the ginger and garlic smells of her food. The air conditioner 
reduces the tropical climate outside to a pleasant temperature, and the window behind Yi 
Ling is covered with grey blinds to keep out the afternoon sun—as well as curious gazes 
of passersby. This is the first time I am in Yi Ling’s office. I had some trouble locating it in 
the rather obscurely named “Medicine Department.” Upon arrival, I asked Yi Ling why 
her department is not called the “Psychology Department.” She answered, looking away: 
“Oh, so that patients don’t have to be seen as part of this” (field notes 30 June 2014).
I understand what she means. Most people in Singapore would not want to be seen 
entering a Psychology Department due to the stigma attached to mental health issues. 
In the psychology clinic where I work, it has happened more than once that a new client 
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asked over the phone if they could “use the back door” so nobody would see them enter 
a mental health facility. Just a few weeks before this meeting with Yi Ling, a friend came 
into the psychology clinic to take me out for lunch and had giggled nervously: “Hope 
people won’t think I’m mentally ill!” (field notes 17 June 2014). There are barriers to people 
seeking mental health treatment, and the generic name of Yi Ling’s clinic is an attempt to 
ease this. Indeed, in the interview, when we discussed her coursework, Yi Ling told me 
that she was “wondering if we would ever get any patients at all, because of the stereotype and 
the stigma in Singapore on mental health” (interview 30 June 2014). Fortunately, patients do 
come. However, applying her clinical psychology expertise in this context of stereotype 
and stigma is not as straightforward as Yi Ling would hope.
When I asked her about her experiences of putting her coursework into practice in 
Singapore, Yi Ling noted the resistance she encounters. Her statement quoted at the begin-
ning of this section reveals two contrasting ideas of clinical psychology in Singapore. First, 
the critique expressed by her Singaporean patients that support groups are “Caucasian” 
illustrates the perception of clinical psychology as “white,” foreign, and Other; and its 
practices, including disclosing one’s feelings or emotions, as non-Singaporean. Indeed, 
the literature has reported that Singaporeans identify as “Asian” (Yeo 1993, 29)—an es-
sentialized cultural category different from “Caucasian.” Thus, Yi Ling’s patients do not 
identify with (parts of) the “western” practice domain of clinical psychology and consider 
these practices culturally incompatible. According to Yi Ling’s patients, clinical psychol-
ogy might be white people’s knowledge. When I prompt her to tell me more about her 
experience of setting up support groups with her colleagues at the hospital, Yi Ling shows 
her own ambivalence. On the one hand, she identifies with her patients, and says: “Well… 
we Chinese are not used to talking about our feelings, our thoughts, it is more about just doing.” 
(interview, 30 June 2014). At the same time, her conviction that programs that are success-
ful according the literature should also be successful in Singapore reflects the contrasting 
perception that evidence-based practices are applicable across cultures. Thus, while Yi 
Ling understands where her patients—or at least her Chinese patients—are coming from, 
she devalues the cultural aspect of clinical psychology practice and relies on the disci-
pline’s universalist scientific basis for its validity and applicability in Singapore.
The perception of scientific knowledge as noncultural and objective seems common 
among psychologists in Singapore. In the psychology clinic where I work, graduate 
students rely on reference books that have “International Edition” written in large font 
on their covers—almost as if the books boast about their generalizability. A few days 
after meeting Yi Ling, Valerie, another colleague at the hospital, explains the utility of 
International Edition reference books in her practice:
Psychology is like a science so a lot of it is based on like objective evidence and it is like thoroughly tested 
through many research trials, you know, in countries where psychology is much more established. So 
definitely the underlying theories are something that all humans regardless of race or culture go through. 
(interview 16 July 2014)
Thus, while Valerie acknowledges that psychology knowledge is constructed in specific 
countries, she considers the scientific methods (the research trials) sufficient to assume 
generalizability. Valerie’s statement reveals a discourse, powerful among psychologists in 
Singapore, which regards science as objective and thus value free. This discourse divorces 
knowledges from their place of conception and renders them applicable across geograph-
ical and cultural regions, thereby dismissing the Foucauldian understanding of truth as 
a social construction of a particular place and time. Clinical psychologists I meet during 
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fieldwork constantly call upon this discourse of clinical psychology knowledge as a do-
main of generalizable scientifically validated truths to justify their practices. However, at 
the same time, Valerie’s reference to “underlying theories” rather than simply “theories,” 
shows slight hesitance in her acceptance of clinical psychology knowledges as universal.
I wonder if the overabundant use of international reference materials is driven solely 
by this discourse of scientific knowledge as generalizable and, relatedly, how locally de-
veloped resources are regarded. Therefore, I visit the psychology sections in the contem-
porary libraries of the universities that teach clinical psychology in Singapore. In the large 
collections of psychology books, I find a dearth of local resources, apart from two small 
books on Counselling in Singapore. However, in online searches I do retrieve research 
articles focusing on clinical psychology practice in Singapore. The next day when I ask 
around in the research common room if such articles have been used during lectures, 
Ryan, a clinical psychology graduate student who just returned from training in Australia, 
looks at me with his eyebrows raised: “Why? Are they even good studies?” (field notes 17 
July 2014). Ryan is questioning the quality of the research conducted in Singapore; per-
haps such studies are not discussed in class because the quality is insufficient? Ryan’s sus-
picion towards Singaporean research demonstrates that the imaginary of what constitutes 
good studies in clinical psychology is limited; good studies are not likely to come from 
Singapore. Relatedly, when at the Medicine Department I ask Valerie whether cultural 
considerations for practice are discussed in the classroom, she responds: “I think it would 
be very relevant. But I don’t know how much research has been done in that area? You know, in the 
Singapore setting?” (interview, 16 July 2014). I receive similar responses from students in 
the psychology clinic: a questioning of the existence of locally developed resources and, 
upon my confirmation of their existence, a subsequent questioning of their quality. These 
responses show that locally conducted studies are currently not part of the corpus of 
clinical psychology knowledge that is communicated through textbooks and transmitted 
through the social relations institutionalized in classrooms or supervision sessions. This 
limits the imaginary of what constitutes good scientific knowledge in clinical psychol-
ogy, silences locally developed knowledges in clinical psychology, and reinforces the reli-
ance on International Edition textbooks that normalize Euro-American research findings. 
Furthermore, psychology graduates employ a discourse of science as objective, value free, 
and universal for producing non-locally developed knowledge as “universal.”
In Australia and the Netherlands there is a similar reliance on international reference 
books in clinical psychology. Taking an example from the Netherlands, I notice that the 
psychologists I interview are aware of the Euro-American centricity of clinical psychology 
research. While interviewees acknowledge this limitation of the literature, my suggestion 
to culturally adapt or tailor theories and methods is often strongly dismissed, while de-
fending the scientific foundation for clinical psychology. For example, Paul, an academic 
staff member in charge of the clinical psychology curriculum at his university responds 
laughingly: “We try to teach them evidence-based psychology. Not hugging with [sic] trees! 
Unless that’s proven to be effective!” (interview 23 May 2014). Paul regards evidence-based 
therapies as the opposite of “tree hugging,” denoting practices which are considered irra-
tional or emotive, the domain of shamans or spiritual healers in contrast to the rational, 
scientific, clinical psychology profession. Thus, clinical psychology knowledge is consid-
ered more valid and valuable because it is based on science. This discourse of science 
validates International Edition textbooks, justifies the application of Euro-American re-
search findings across borders, and silences (in this case by ridiculing) alternatives or 
adjustments to the instituted knowledge domain of clinical psychology.
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II. International, thus Rational Knowledge
Because we are such a young country and even today, I don't think we are very grown in this field yet and 
for that reason I don't think we have enough experience and enough, you know, information […] So be-
cause of that I think it is not surprising to hear that we are drawing on practices from all these other places 
where psychology is much more established. (Valerie, clinical psychologist, Singapore, interview, 16 
July 2014)
In a cafe on the hospital grounds, I ask Valerie about her training experiences. She 
explains that she completed her clinical psychology training in Singapore. She imme-
diately adds that for “several reasons,” including the entry requirements of Australian 
accredited programs and “family commitments,” she could not conduct clinical psychol-
ogy training in Australia, suggesting that choosing the Singaporean program requires 
justification. If circumstances had allowed, she would have completed her training in 
a country where the discipline is “much more established” (see quote at the beginning of 
this section) and mentions Australia, the United Kingdom, and the USA. She continues 
that fortunately, in her opinion, she studied reference books from these countries and 
was supervised by British and American clinical psychologists in Singapore. She feels 
like she has gotten the best of both worlds. Being trained in Singapore gave her “a faster 
sort of route toward the way of what it is like to practice here in the real setting.” Meanwhile, 
her foreign supervisors:
They have had a wider and broader exposure […] So their approaches may be different, and that helps to 
sort of become less narrow-minded. Even though the approach may not be hosted or applicable here – it 
gives us a start to think about what else can be done. (interview, 16 July 2014)
Connoting herself and peers as narrow minded, and her foreign supervisors as experi-
enced and knowledgeable, Valerie puts her international colleagues on a pedestal while 
devaluing her local peers. Consequently, Valerie regards international collaboration as 
beneficial to the development of clinical psychology in Singapore.
Valerie is only one of the many informants that express the idea that students, ac-
ademics, and professionals of clinical psychology in Singapore are less experienced in 
their practice and less fluent in their psychology knowledge compared to people from 
other places. Her quote at the beginning of this section portrays Singapore and its in-
habitants as an apprentice who needs to learn from the more mature and experienced 
leading countries in clinical psychology—the empires of knowledge. This discourse of 
Singapore’s external dependency for its development and survival is prominent and 
powerful in the city-state more generally (Matthews and Sidhu 2005). Among clinical 
psychologists, it seems to justify a reliance on foreign resources, including literature and 
experts—thus perpetuating a situation of dependence—and negating the development of 
local resources. Valerie considers locally trained supervisors less open-minded than their 
foreign trained peers; likewise, Ryan (in the previous section) questioned the quality of 
research conducted in Singapore and its utility in the training program. The underlying 
assumption is that adopting foreign knowledge paves the way for the future of clinical 
psychology. The knowledge practices of clinical psychology are imagined to be mostly in 
the minds and hands of foreign “others” in western countries.
The notion that the adoption of clinical psychology ideas and resources from abroad is a 
step towards modernizing Singapore’s mental health care stimulates internationalization. 
Consequently, some psychologists express gratefulness for the Australian involvement in 
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clinical psychology education in Singapore. For example, Cheryl, who I meet in another 
hospital, says that about half of her classmates in Australia were Singaporean (interview, 
3 July 2014). I respond by saying I find that a large number. Cheryl thinks about my 
comment for a while and concludes that apparently Australians “really want to transfer 
the knowledge and grow the field of psychology outside Australia by offering their expertise [to 
Singaporeans].” I merely nod my head, and when I ask her how the cultural diversity in 
her class affected her coursework experiences, she replies dismissively: “the program was 
very much based on the knowledge that we need to gain, rather than the cultural nuances” and 
continues to talk about the positive effects of Australia “modernizing” the field of clinical 
psychology in Singapore (interview, 3 July 2014). After this conversation, I reflect in my 
fieldwork journal: “She talks about Australia almost in an old Colombo Plan manner: a return 
to development aid through knowledge sharing?” Cheryl’s perspective denotes a notion of 
modernization in terms of development theory, in which Australia is seen as more de-
veloped, and therefore as the provider of the “right” knowledge. It suggests that clinical 
psychology is, ultimately, modern (and thus rational and culture free), and requires little 
modification in Singapore.
Cheryl, Yi Ling, and Ryan received Australian-accredited education, as approximately 
three-quarters of clinical psychology graduates in Singapore do each year.1  The current 
border-transcending education arrangements between Singapore and Australia rely on 
the premise of cross-cultural applicability. Three years before Cheryl started, Amirah com-
pleted the Singapore-Australian program. She was “one of the earlier batches [of students]” 
to complete the joint program and has since been working as a clinical psychologist in the 
government sector (interview 4 March 2014). Her recollections of experiences in Australia 
show how the premise of cross-cultural applicability was explicitly communicated during 
coursework: 
One of the things one of my [Australian] lecturers said was like stuck in my head until now. She said that 
no matter what culture you're from … that the same principles apply, and the same treatment has been 
found to be effective. (interview, 4 March 2014)
Perhaps consequently, Amirah did not encounter discussions in the classroom of the 
cross-cultural applicability of the teaching materials, even though a considerable number 
of students were international students, and most literature was “quite written on the US 
and the European populations.” Amirah didn’t ask her Australian lecturer any further ques-
tions on the origin and applicability of her curriculum and says: “I thought that even if I 
come back to Singapore and there will be Malays, Chinese, and Indians, it should work with them” 
(interview, 4 March 2014). Her comment highlights how lecturers can shape the idea of 
clinical psychology as universally applicable. In the context of international higher educa-
tion, social interactions between foreign lecturers and foreign students can reproduce the 
notion of the body of clinical psychology knowledge as globally relevant.
Apart from internationalization of higher education, standardization plays a role in 
the production of “‘universal” knowledge in clinical psychology. During my field visits 
to Australia I meet Singaporean students who explain the rationale for studying abroad: 
their accredited degree means international recognition of their skills. Therefore, stan-
dardized and accredited degrees are considered higher quality and a more prestigious 
education. Indeed, Nadia, a Singaporean student who is halfway through her graduate 
training, explains her reason for choosing to study in Australia rather than in Singapore: 
“I thought it didn’t make sense for me to go with a very young, unrecognized program when I 
can be in a more recognized program […] Accreditation gets me up to a better position to practice 
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more globalized [sic]” (interview, 11 March 2014). Thus, according to Nadia, rather than 
the corpus of knowledge itself, the ways of knowledge transmission determine how she 
is valued socially as a professional. In other words—and reminding us of Barth’s three 
interrelated facets of knowledge—the ways of knowledge transmission and the instituted 
social relations that come with an internationally accredited degree add value to her clin-
ical psychology knowledge.
These cases of studying in Singapore and in Australia demonstrate the idea that inter-
nationalization and standardization of curricula are beneficial for the future development 
of clinical psychology in Singapore, and for individuals’ future careers. However, all the 
cases indicate friction. Valerie noted that some of the therapeutic approaches introduced 
by her foreign supervisors in Singapore “may not be hosted or applicable here” (interview, 
16 July 2014), demonstrating limitations of international knowledge in terms of practical 
applicability. Cheryl, who trained partly in Australia, reduced cultural considerations to 
mere “nuances” (interview, 3 July 2014), while Amirah’s Australian lecturer dismissed cul-
tural considerations altogether (interview 4 March 2014). However, Cheryl also noted that 
she encountered “problems in terms of language issues and also whether in terms of, you know… 
if one practice that would be developed in [the United] States, developed in England, developed 
in Australia, would be applicable here [sic]” (interview 3 July 2014). Likewise, when I asked 
Amirah whether she thought her lecturer was correct in stating that the same principles 
and treatments apply across cultures, she replied, hesitantly:
Uuuuhm… Not really, no.” She smiled and continued: I had counselling experience already. I worked 
already for four and a half years before the masters. And I know that the cognitive stuff [cognitive be-
havioural therapy] is really difficult, you know, for Malays, or Chinese or Indians. (interview, 4 March 
2014)
Similarly, when I said goodbye to Nadia as I left her campus in Australia, she emphasized 
that she considered my research topic personally relevant: “I am a Singaporean practicing 
and learning in Australia and plan to go back to Singapore to practice. So, this is one of my con-
cerns” (interview, 11 March 2014). These concerns or frictions are at the interstices of a 
firm belief in an internationally relevant scientific corpus of “universal” knowledge called 
clinical psychology on the one hand and, on the other hand, the messy reality of applying 
that domain of knowledge to humans who are each unique and affected by culture.
III. Power in Practice: Knowledge Transmission in a Postcolonial World
As trainees, I don't think that we have a very active voice, especially [as] we feel like we don't have avenues 
to talk about these things because … can you do it in a safe environment in which you feel like it won't 
affect your grades, so it won't affect the relationship? I'm not sure. (Jasmin, clinical psychology stu-
dent, Singapore, interview, 7 March 2014)
Jasmin will receive her clinical psychology degree within the next few months and is 
currently working as if she is already a certified professional. We are in her consultation 
room at the mental health clinic in Singapore, both seated on small, yellow children’s 
stools. An apple green table, also at children’s height, sits between us topped by sketching 
paper, colored crayons, and my audio recorder. I regret wearing a skirt today, as my at-
tempt to look modest on this stool forces me into a rather uncomfortable position. At the 
other side of the table, Jasmin is wearing jeans and a brown top, she has her feet planted 
at both sides of the stool, elbows resting on her knees. Her relaxed posture shows she has 
sat at this table before. Jasmin specializes in working with children and their families.
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The conversation with Jasmin had started like others I had encountered during this 
research: Jasmin immediately assumed the interviewee role and politely answered my 
questions on her clinical psychology training and practice. This is a consequence of field-
work with clinical psychologists who are trained in the role play embodiments of struc-
tured and semistructured interviewing. However, my interview style is informal and 
flexible, allowing room for change, and as the conversation progresses I feel as if I am 
witnessing Jasmin’s growth from passive student who answers my questions to confident 
practitioner who introduces the topics she wants to assert. Her voice becomes deeper 
and increases in volume, she articulates her words better, gesticulates and uses body lan-
guage, and inserts pauses to emphasize her points—it is almost as if Jasmin increases in 
size. I listen to her in awe, thoroughly enjoying this toppling of the hierarchy between us. 
Jasmin starts to direct the conversation, demands my attention, and makes me an insider 
on thoughts (she confides to me later) that she had been having for a long time but had 
not felt able to express so explicitly before.
Jasmin tells me how she and her classmates encounter friction between the cultural 
expectations implicit in clinical psychology teachings and the local cultural expectations 
to which they are accustomed. She gives an example of living arrangements: in Singapore 
it is common for people over thirty to live with their parents. Jasmin notes that this might 
be “a very strange concept for [our lecturers] who come here from Australia or the UK.” She 
feels that the foreign lecturers “lack awareness about the situation and even after they have 
been taught about the situation…in their mind they just don’t understand [it].” She recalls a 
situation, which was also encountered by some of her classmates, in which she discussed 
with her foreign supervisor a case of a client who was an adult living with their parents: 
“they keep saying ’oh their relationship is very enmeshed’ or things like that, without actually 
realising that you have to take it from the perspective of a local Asian context, where these things 
happen. Where this thing is normal” (interview, 7 March 2014). Jasmin’s and her classmates’ 
experiences reveal their perception of their Australian and British lecturers as valuing in-
dependence. They regard this cultural expectation to be consistent with clinical psychol-
ogy theories. However, Jasmin and other Singaporeans may not value independence in 
the same way and might consequently regard clinical psychology teachings as culturally 
inappropriate. This highlights that clinical psychology knowledge is not value free and is 
thus not necessarily transferable across place and time.
When I had enquired whether she or her classmates discuss these differing cultural 
expectations and values with their lecturers or supervisors, Jasmin responded with the 
quote at the beginning of this section that clearly reflects the experience of social hierar-
chies and power differentials in teaching relationships. I prompt her to tell me more, and 
Jasmin notes that students feel they do not have an “active voice” in the classroom (inter-
view, 7 March 2014). Therefore, she and her peers refrain from challenging their lecturers 
or supervisors, from questioning the status quo, and from introducing their own (cultur-
ally informed) ideas into clinical psychology training. As a result, academics’ views and 
interpretations of clinical psychology knowledge, which highlight particular values, are 
prioritized and go unquestioned, leaving the relevance or applicability of clinical psy-
chology ideas in relation to local cultural expectations undiscussed. This situation clearly 
shows the importance of social relations in the classroom in the production of knowledge.
Apart from Jasmin, most students and alumni in Singapore seemed very reluctant to 
critique the knowledge that was transmitted through their academic mentors. However, 
during fieldwork, I encountered several occasions when students or newly graduated 
psychologists followed me outside of the fieldwork site of the campus or clinic to share 
Anthropology & Education Quarterly Volume 51, 202040
how they disagreed with their academic supervisors on certain psychology related top-
ics. This reveals that students can consider their workplaces or universities unsafe for 
expressing critiques of the body of knowledge and demonstrate fear of being overheard 
by the academics or supervisors who are considered in charge of that knowledge. Here 
the Foucauldian (1980) interweaving of power/knowledge is evident: academics and su-
pervisors are considered to have more knowledge and thus more power, and because of 
their powerful positions they remain in a position in which they define knowledge. In 
other words, through the effects of power/knowledge, academics and supervisors have a 
greater influence than students in defining and redefining the corpus of clinical psychol-
ogy knowledge. Students in Singapore silence their ideas and perspectives on the corpus 
of clinical psychology knowledge because they do not consider themselves experts.
Due to power/knowledge effects, clinical psychology education can be repressive. 
This is also experienced by some students in the Netherlands and Australia, especially 
those who have a non-western background or experiences. For example, Maria is a ma-
ture student at a Dutch university with several years of working experience in Asia. Like 
Jasmin, she has nearly graduated and will soon receive her clinical psychology degree. 
When I ask Maria how she integrates her experiences in Asia with her coursework, she 
responds: “No, [the lecturers] were stopping it from me when I was saying things. They were 
saying no, no, no, no, no” (interview, 7 May 2014). She recalls an interaction in the classroom 
between a Dutch student who role played a clinical psychologist and a female actor of 
non-Dutch origin who role played the client. Maria and her supervisor were observing. 
After the role play, Maria and the actor both said that the student was too directive, upon 
which the lecturer responded: “No! This is the way we’re supposed to do it!” Maria slams her 
fist on the table as she recounts the incident, remembering how the lecturer presented his 
instructions as absolutist norms for clinical psychology practice: “And the way he said it 
was a very like: It’s that there! That! That! We don’t do that! It’s always like that!” (interview, 7 
May 2014). Maria’s experience illustrates power dynamics in classrooms, in this example 
with a gender aspect, in which a clinical psychology “expert” subjugates ideas and per-
spectives of those who are considered less knowledgeable. In other words, the power of 
an academic within the social setting of the classroom provides his/her applications or 
interpretations of clinical psychology knowledge with a sense of validity.
Back in Singapore, the stories of students and alumni reveal the complexities of knowl-
edge transmission in a postcolonial country. This is another reason I am relieved that 
Jasmin takes over our conversation; I sense that my white skin color prevents some in-
formants from expressing postcolonial critiques in front of me. Indeed, in the psychology 
clinic, students only started to utter critical comments about their “Caucasian” supervi-
sors in my presence after I had worked there for over half a year (demonstrating the value 
of long-term fieldwork). At times such critiques are even accompanied by an apology: “So 
[a British supervisor] says my report writing is bad ah? I am working for three years already. Three 
years! So we all write bad reports in Singapore then? Sorry Lennie, I know you’re not like that!” 
(field notes 15 September 2014). This demonstrates that I may have become a “safe” white 
person, accepted to be around when intimacies are discussed among cultural insiders, but 
I am nevertheless still a white person.
However, Jasmin talks quite openly to me about the postcolonial context of clinical 
psychology education. She recalls situations in which her non-Singaporean lecturers gave 
unsolicited cultural critique during their classes, for instance, on the corporeal punish-
ment of children. She states: “I don't condone it, but it is part of the Asian culture” (interview, 
7 March 2014). However, she feels that “sometimes the supervisors come in or the lecturers 
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come in and they have, you know, their western way of thinking.” She continues to recall an 
incident in which a British lecturer critiqued the spanking of children as inappropriate 
for children’s development. She looks at me with her eyebrows raised, and recollects how 
she thought:
So, it is kind of strange when you come into the country, point out things that you don't agree with in the 
country, and we used to be a colony of yours. So sometimes the students do like, after a session or after 
the lessons, like, we will talk and kind of say like “oh our lecturer wasn't behaving very appropriately.” 
(interview, 7 March 2014).
This demonstrates awareness of postcolonial power differentials on the students’ part; 
less so on the lecturers’. Students in Singapore do not openly challenge the ideas of ac-
ademics, contrary to Maria’s case from the Netherlands, but they do engage in critique 
among themselves after lectures. This shows that cultural aspects of clinical psychology 
knowledge that are deemed “white,” “neocolonial,” or otherwise culturally inappropriate 
are probably only contested outside the social setting of the classroom. In the anthropol-
ogy of knowledge, we can see here the reciprocal workings of situated milieus and human 
actions: in the classroom setting students assume a knowledge-receiving role, whereas it 
empowers academics to take a more knowledge-defining position. However, outside the 
classroom and out of earshot of their academics, students say to each other: “[The lecturer] 
didn’t seem to have the cultural context of how he spoke of things without thinking that: oh, I’m 
a white person, coming from a country that used to rule this country!” (Jasmin, interview, 4 
March 2014).
This call for lecturers to understand the postcolonial context in which they are teaching 
and to be reserved in their cultural critiques seems to contrast with the idea outlined in 
the previous section—in Valerie’s words: that clinical psychologists in Singapore need to 
learn from people from “other places where psychology is much more established” (interview, 
16 July 2014). Thus, a paradoxical situation exists in which, on the one hand, (aspiring) 
clinical psychologists express a thirst for “universal,” scientific and supposedly value free 
scientific knowledge in clinical psychology delivered by internationally recognized ex-
perts or institutions from knowledge empires (the United Kingdom, Australia, and the 
United States specifically). On the other hand, and at the backstage, (aspiring) clinical 
psychologists express a resistance towards these situations as they consider them neo-
colonial. Thus, the question arises: Which norms are regarded as cultural critique, and 
which are regarded as clinical psychology knowledge? This seems to be person—and 
situation—dependent. There is no clear border between knowledge considered of clinical 
value and knowledge perceived as imposed neocolonialism. The example, for instance 
above regarding punishment of children, can be viewed as clinical advice which recom-
mends not using negative reinforcement on children, or it can be regarded a neocolonial 
critique of practices of corporeal punishment that are used in Singapore.
It should be noted that some academics actively worked on establishing an egali-
tarian relationship with their students with differing effects. For example, Lisa, quoted 
at the start of this paper, is also a “white” academic working in Singapore. When I 
asked about her experiences with supervising local clinical psychology students, she 
said that instead of seeing the norms in clinical psychology as a “world standard”: “I 
am constantly trying to appreciate where [my supervisees] are coming from” (interview, 17 
April 2014). Lisa thus regards clinical psychology as less prescriptive, and more open 
to interpretation. Similarly, Rachel, an academic from the United States notes about her 
Singaporean supervisees that: “They know me well enough to be able to say: ‘that is very 
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American’” (interview, 7 March 2014). Lisa and Rachel say they receive valuable cul-
tural feedback from their supervisees, which allows them to develop more culturally 
sensitive knowledge. By actively working on deconstructing the power differential in 
their supervisory relationships, Lisa and Rachel enabled their cultural awareness to 
grow and gained insights into cultural adaptations of clinical psychology practices. This 
demonstrates that the discourses of the neutrality of scientific “truths” (which normal-
ize Euro-American knowledge across borders and justify international application and 
standardization of the corpus of clinical psychology knowledge), as well as power dif-
ferentials in instituted social relations (through which this corpus is communicated and 
transmitted), can be contested.
Conclusions and Openings
The ethnographic encounters analyzed in this paper through Barth’s anthropology of 
knowledge (2002) demonstrate how knowledge is reproduced as “universal” in contem-
porary higher education. The case studies highlight that “universal” knowledge is not an 
a priori corpus of ideas “out there” but, rather, is communicated and transmitted within 
specific social relations, settings, and geographies of contemporary higher education.
The ethnographic discussion shows how knowledge is constructed and reproduced 
as “universal” when it is deemed scientific, and thus neutral, and is delivered by a pow-
erful actor. Hence, in determining the validity of knowledge, it is not sufficient to only 
analyze how knowledge is produced; who produces and disseminates knowledge is like-
wise important. The ethnographic details reveal the uneven power relations of knowl-
edge-producing actors and their ability to establish criteria for the validity of knowledge. 
For example, academics are more powerful than students, and research from some areas 
of the world is more likely to be valued and spread transnationally. This is reflected in, 
for example, the abundance of international edition American textbooks across the three 
countries and the presence of Australian-accredited curricula in Singapore. This clearly 
demonstrates that not only are knowledge and power interrelated, but they are linked to 
geography.
Contemporary higher education reproduces historical geographies of colonial power: 
knowledges can be perceived as “white” and as value impositions. Invoking Foucault’s 
notion of interwoven power/knowledge, the nexus of power/knowledge and geography 
is articulated as “geographies of power/knowledge” (Fahey and Kenway 2010). Specific 
territories at particular times have a privileged power/knowledge position. Knowledge 
produced in these territories is valued and deemed valid and is more likely incorporated 
into the corpus of “universal” knowledge. The United States, Europe, and Australia cur-
rently hold key positions in the global politics of knowledge of clinical psychology and 
form an “empire of knowledge” (Fahey and Kenway 2010, 629). Knowledge produced in 
the “empire” sets the standards and thereby defines “normalcy”– in the specific case of 
clinical psychology this pertains to both notions of truth and notions of mental health or 
illness. The empire thus produces a core body of knowledge that can act as a system of 
oppression that silences ‘others’ by rendering their knowledges invalid and not univer-
sally applicable. Indeed, ethnography reveals that psychology research from Singapore 
is not transmitted in curricula or communicated in classroom or practice settings and 
is thus not visible. When the lack of Singapore research was made apparent to research 
participants by the ethnographer, the quality of locally developed research was put under 
question. In this way the local remains outside the domain of “universal” knowledge. In 
short, the validity of a knowledge as “universal” can be considered a result of power/
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knowledge effects—and through these effects historical colonial power relations continue 
to be reproduced.
Higher education is increasingly being recognized as an important subject for investi-
gation in anthropology. This paper illustrates the value of such an investigation and opens 
up new avenues of anthropological research focusing on academic disciplines and their 
curricula. It provides ethnographic examples of how “universal” knowledge is cohered 
through standardization and accreditation. The ethnographic examples detail instances in 
which informants used similar techniques and theories of clinical psychology across the 
three case study countries—showing the coherence of the transmission and application 
of this body of knowledge in these three disparate regions of the world. The evidence 
further reveals that knowledge coherence is assisted by discourses of the universal truth 
of science as well as the desire for modernity. This was most evident during fieldwork 
in Singapore. Psychologists’ ideas of the importance of science helped to maintain the 
coherence of the knowledge presented in textbooks and standardized curricula, despite 
realizations that not all parts of this knowledge would be applicable or relevant. In addi-
tion, discourses of modernization in Singapore also assisted in maintaining knowledge 
coherence, as they provided a rationale for relying on the body of “universal” knowl-
edge. These insights, derived from ethnography, demonstrate the merit of anthropologi-
cal investigations of academic disciplines by revealing the role of discursive structures in 
knowledge reproduction.
The ethnographic encounters also draw attention to the interweaving of higher educa-
tion with larger political forces, including neoliberalism. The mechanisms for maintaining 
knowledge coherence, standardization and accreditation, problematically present knowl-
edge as value free and as non-cultural. This is especially problematic for clinical psychol-
ogy, which prescribes norms of behavior and mental processes that lead to social inclusion 
or exclusion (Hook 2007). The assumption of the universal validity of clinical psychology 
knowledge marginalizes the cultural politics that are commonly involved in the defini-
tion of normalcy in society. Furthermore, the marginalization of cultural politics extends 
to higher education. The South-American scholars Claudia Matus and Marta Infante 
(2011), writing from the perspective of educational development, argue that by margin-
alizing cultural difference universities are paving the way for the neutrality needed for 
the enactment of market assumptions and are thus serving the neoliberal agenda. When 
knowledges are accepted as “universal truths” without questioning their local validity, 
this results in the production of culturally coherent future citizens (Matus and Infante 
2011)—everyone subjected to the same norms and sharing the same values. The neoliberal 
university thus promotes notions of knowledge as universal and neutral.
However, our analysis of the words and experiences of students, academics, and prac-
titioners of clinical psychology also suggest potentialities for change that arise through 
the interstices of everyday, locally situated practices. This points to the importance of em-
bedding the study of knowledge in local social contexts in which knowledges are applied 
and actualized. The ethnographic encounters reveal cracks in the notion of “universal” 
knowledge. For example, in Singapore, clinical psychology advice given by an experi-
enced academic supervisor can be perceived as a neocolonial value imposition by a local 
student or professional—questioning if clinical psychology is actually value free. In the 
Netherlands, a student with international work experience unexpectedly witnesses how 
a clinical psychology practice taught in the classroom is too directive—worrying whether 
clinical psychology is appropriate for cross-cultural application. In Australia, a country 
renowned for its transnational higher education sector, an international student wonders 
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how she would apply clinical psychology knowledge in her home country—and whether 
it would be accepted at all. Through these informants’ experiences, small openings ap-
pear through which diversity may gain voice. In these interstices students, academics 
and clinical psychology practitioners in the field can begin to produce culturally specific 
research agendas that enable them to address the topic that has all the while been under-
lying this paper: the anthropological question of whose knowledge? (Fabian 2012).
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